Textbook of Maritime Medicine

Where piracy is concerned, regional growth trends are always directly related to economic crises and inadequate legal and security systems. Somalia is a recent example. When the Barre regime was overthrown in the early 1990s by the clan-based warlords, the state lost control of its own coastal waters, and began the sporadic first phase of Somali piracy. Trawlers from other countries were able to fish in Somali waters unhindered, jeopardising the livelihood of local fishermen and leading to violent disputes[1] that have emerged as the country has lost its ability to patrol its waters over time. The local fishermen were more or less defenceless against the large foreign trawlers and increasingly turned to piracy to safeguard their own survival[2].

The rate of piracy incidents off the Horn of Africa has escalated since 2005. This battle still continues, accompanied by the power struggle between the warlords, which has now been extended to the sea. The warlords are using the power gap in Somalia for their own private attacks on ships, above all with the intention of demanding ransoms.

The most important cause is surely the extreme economic and social hardships suffered by the general population since the Ethiopian invasion, leaving the majority without any other sources of income than crime and creating an experienced need for parts of the population to turn to piracy.

The identity of the Somali pirates, their social structures, motives, etc. is not generally known. The number is unknown, but it has been increasing since the middle of the present decade; primarily they come from the Puntland region of Somalia and it does not seem to have a unified organization with a clear command structure, being reportedly fishermen and former militia members of the Somali warlords. Several of the pirate groups argue that fishermen have become pirates because their way of life was destroyed by illegal fishing and toxic waste dumping that has been ignored by foreign governments and see, or have at least depicted, themselves as protectors, either of their local communities or of the local marine environment, adopting names such as “National Volunteer Coastguard” (NVCG), “The Guards of Somali Marine Resources”, “Central Regional Coast Guard” or “Somali Coast Guard” to suggest that they are involved in a more legal occupation than piracy and claim that they were forced to organize themselves to defend their sea waters after foreign nations started to fish illegally in Somali territorial waters and consequently that they are acting in a maritime security capacity. Pirates have the tendency to characterize their actions as an alternative livelihood or as a retribution for illegal international activities in Somali waters because they believe that they have every right and entitlement to attack illegal fishing vessels operating in their territorial waters as their fishing resources are being pillaged daily by international shipping vessels from Asia and Europe. Even though it seems to have kept at least most of the proceeds for themselves and this reasoning may mask the opportunistic piracy of some, pirates have claimed to be distributing the “tax” demanded from foreign vessels in the form of ransom in return for fishing rights more evenly.

Some of the growth in piracy along the eastern coast of Somalia may be explained by the rising volume of humanitarian aid coming in, e.g. from the World Food Programme (WFP), providing an estimated 185,000 metric tonnes of food to the Somali population, around ten times the amount provided in 2004. Pirate’s attacks initially focused on attacking ships in this zone declining significantly when France began to provide escort-protection for sailing to WFP shipping to Somalia in November 2007. This, united to the fact that ships operating on that route shifted further out to sea, may be one of the reasons why Somali pirates shifted their focus to the Gulf of Aden, where there is a high concentration of merchant ships in a constrained waterway providing better hunting areas. Nowadays that international naval forces are patrolling the Gulf of Aden with some effectiveness (the number of successful hijackings has dropped even though the number of attempted attacks has not decreased), Somali pirates have shifted some of their focus back to the Indian Ocean, and are now able to operate hundreds of nautical miles from the Somali coastline, often with the help and support of larger fishing vessels often acquired or commandeered by acts of piracy, known as ‘mother ships’ able to launch smaller boats (skiffs) to perpetrate pirate attacks, a new modus operandi that allows attacks on large vessels such as large oil and container vessels.

The negotiation of the bilateral and multilateral initiatives in the Straits of Malacca region highlighted several issues that may be of interest to parties seeking to establish similar programs in the Horn of Africa region, namely the importance of addressing local concerns over sovereignty, territorial water rights, and the presence of foreign military forces in regional waters.

Finally, owing to their only characteristic, the model of Somali pirates seems to be different to other regions as the Straits of Malacca or Nigeria where ships are boarded either to take the vessel or its contents. This Somali piracy can be viewed as a way of maritime kidnapping because its only characteristic has been routinely taking the target vessel’s crew hostage in return for ransom payments. This is possible because the pirates have sanctuaries on land in Somalia and in its territorial waters from which they can commit pirate attacks and conduct ransom negotiations, something which is less likely in other parts of the world. As a consequence, the maritime security forces are challenging the traditional engagement strategies and tactics.

16.5.1  Piracy in Somalia-Horn of Africa: How the Problem can be tackled

Taking into account that a reliable government of Somalia in the foreseeable future capable of establishing the necessary policing to control and remove pirates from the country is unlikely[3], a situation that would be the best deterrent factor against piracy in the Somali-Horn of Africa region, would be a long-term government, according to most experts.

In this paragraph, we will make a general reference to the measures that international community and the private actors are taking or proposing now regarding piracy in this world area of major concern nowadays.

Given the continuous tendency to an increase of piracy in different areas of the world, the increase of violence in the attacks and the resurgence of more sophisticated ways of piracy, especially since the eighties, where the organized crime seems to have entered, we could make ourselves the question why? The answer is simple because pirates have all the advantages as they have the whole sea to act[4]. Modern radars let them see if they are being pursued, what means that they can wait and commit a crime with impunity knowing that they will have enough time to escape if any security forces of intervention decide to act.

The difficulties are huge not only due to the extension of the areas to patrol, but also to the lack of available financial resources of some countries to apply them for that purpose. In order to create a response capability which can face the pirates, a considerable fund allocation would be necessary and some countries do not have enough money to assign it to achieve this objective. If to these difficulties, we add the political problems which arise when pirates acting in border waters between two countries, are able to move from one jurisdiction to another quickly, we may consider that there is much to do regarding this matter. The situation still worsens when many countries, instead of recognizing the difficulties and the reality and seriousness of the facts they face, tend to be reluctant and expose lots of arguments trying to base on the non-existence of the problem and in case it exists, there is nothing to do. 

Although any initiative is welcome, it is doubtful that the criminals described along these pages will be really affected by them. All this is because the main problem is to be able to “catch the pirates”, and not so much “what to do with them once they have been caught”.

The lack of resources of some coastal countries to fight piracy at sea has already been stated and this situation is understandable and acceptable; but what really exists up till now and it is unacceptable is the lack of any way of coordinated response on land. Pirates act on the seas with the only purpose to commit their illegal acts; but it is clear that they must land at the end of the day to dispose to get their haul and it is here where they are vulnerable.  Up to now, the rules oriented to fight the piracy and enacted by different countries are not dissuasive enough; at first, they seem not to affect the local people they legislate for, and then it is a problem that does not affect them. After several initiatives at a regional and international level have come into operation, mainly in the Malacca Straits and in the Gulf of Aden, this local attitude is bound to change and the countries may cooperate in order to save the sea from this threat to free sailing.

[1] For example, The United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization estimated that 700-foreign owned vessels were fully engaged in unlicensed fishing in Somali waters by 2005.

[2] For example, a July 2005 report from the United Kingdom Department for International Development (DFID) estimated that Somalis lost $100 million to illegal tuna and shrimp fishing in the country’s exclusive economic zone in 2003-2004.

[3] At present, the internationally recognized Transitional Federal Government (TFG) is working with the Alliance for the Reliberation of Somalia (ARS) on efforts to form a unity government and reconstitute national security and law enforcement entities. There are no reasons to trust the future or the success of their goals (it is the 15^th interim government structure since 1991).

[4] For example, the geographical area of concern in the Indian Ocean off Somalia’s eastern coast needed to patrol, has been measured at more than 1 million square miles.